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Abstract:- This paper examines the political role of radical development NGOs that 
emerged in Bangladesh to challenge the marginalization of subordinate groups and 
strengthen democratic processes. After briefly introducing the political context of 
Bangladesh and its NGOs, the paper identifies and defines a radical NGO sub-sector. 
It then reviews the activities of these organizations during the pre-1990 military 
government era and during the subsequent period of electoral democracy. Some 
important achievements are identified, but also many failures that have led to decline, 
leaving behind an NGO sector dominated by credit and service delivery 
organizations. The paper then explains this decline by focusing on three inter-related 
factors: (i) an institutional setting dominated by clientelistic structures that have 
undermined efforts to build horizontal alliances among excluded groups in civil 
society, or links between NGOs and political parties; (ii) a shift in donor support from 
mobilization to market-based service delivery agencies; and (iii) internal structures 
that have generated legitimacy and accountability problems by encouraging elite 
capture, co-option and personalised leadership in the radical sub-sector. It concludes 
with some brief reflections on the main implications of these failures. 
 
 
Introduction: Bangladesh, NGOs and democratization 
 
In 1990 Bangladesh began its transition from a decade and half of authoritarian 
military rule towards the construction of a democratic state with a parliamentary 
system based on regular elections. This shift coincided with the rise of a diverse set of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as development actors across the world after 
the end of Cold War. Given the high profile and strength of Bangladesh’s NGO 
sector, it might have been expected that NGOs that took a political approach to 
development - through community level organising, empowerment and advocacy 
work - would have thrived during the efforts at democratic consolidation that have 
followed. Despite Bangladesh’s international reputation for possessing a dynamic and 
diverse civil society, organizations in the country’s “radical NGO sub-sector” that 
focused their work on grassroots mobilization and collective action instead went into 
                                                
1 The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Teddy Brett, Joseph 
Devine, Khushi Kabeer, Nazneen Kanji, and two anonymous referees during the 
preparation of this paper. However, any inaccuracies are the author’s own. This paper 
draws on my interviews with NGO leaders and staff conducted during visits to 
Bangladesh in 2006 (UK Economic and Social Research Council ESRC Grant 
Reference RES-155-25-0064) and in 2015. I also draw on interviews conducted with 
Comilla Proshika staff under a Nuffield Foundation grant (Reference SGS/00456/G). 
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decline. Today, most of these radical development organizations that were once 
leading players in the country’s NGO scene have now either changed their 
orientation, or faded away altogether. How do we explain the relative failure of 
radical NGOs whose approach had once seemed promising to build on initial signs of 
success and make a significant contribution to the tasks of challenging the 
marginalization of subordinate groups and strengthening democratic processes? This 
paper analyses the rise and fall of this sub-sector against the backdrop of 
Bangladesh’s changing political landscape and institutions, the role of international 
funding agencies, and the complex organizational issues that characterise civil society 
actors. 
 
The paper begins with a discussion of the country’s political context of and the main 
characteristics of its development NGO sector, before defining and characterizing the 
radical sub-sector. The next section offers a historical overview of organizations in 
this sub-sector during the military government period before 1990 and the electoral 
democracy era that has followed. It documents a set of important NGO achievements 
but also analyses a series of problems and striking failures that have led to the virtual 
elimination of this sub-sector, leaving an NGO landscape that is today instead 
dominated by credit and service delivery organizations. This decline is explained by 
three inter-related factors: (i) an institutional setting that remains characterized by 
clientelistic structures that have undermined efforts to build horizontal alliances 
among excluded groups in civil society, or links between NGOs and political parties; 
(ii) the shifting focus of international donor support that once favoured forms of 
social mobilization and people’s self-development towards the more recent 
preoccupation with market-based service delivery agencies; and (iii) the internal 
structures of NGOs that have contributed to legitimacy and accountability problems 
by encouraging elite capture, co-option and personalised leadership. It concludes with 
some brief reflections on the main implications of these failures. 
 
Political context: instability, clientelism and “illiberal democracy” 
 
When Bangladesh broke from Pakistan in 1971, the new state took shape within a 
macro-level power structure that rested on a fragile alliance between three urban elite 
groups – the bureaucracy, the military and the political leadership. The result was a 
coalition that depended crucially on the support of the rural landowning elite. In 
exchange for political support, the government rewarded rural elites with a flow of 
development resources primarily in the form of agricultural and other subsidies, 
within a controlled process of agricultural modernization that soon came to be 
underwritten by a substantial influx of mainly Western foreign aid (Sobhan 1982).1 
The deal was that these elites would guarantee a level of political and social stability 
in what remained a predominantly peasant society based mainly on traditional rural 
institutions. This system connected with and reinforced community hierarchies in 
rural areas, where patron-client relations were the dominant principle of organization. 
An influential local power structure study undertaken in the late 1970s in villages 
entitled The Net: The Power Structure in 10 Villages (BRAC 1980) had shown 
vividly how government efforts to transfer development resources to subordinate 
groups - such as subsidised agricultural inputs, farmer loans and emergency relief 
goods - tended to be captured by village landowner elite clients. As a result these 
resources failed to reach the poor as planned, with a proportion invested by elites in 
their own rural livelihoods and the rest distributed as patronage goods within village 
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level vertical patron-client relationships. Local elites therefore served both as clients 
and as patrons within this system. 
 
Clientelism, as Gay (1998) reminds us, is not a fixed system of exchange relationships 
or a simple barrier to change but is instead subject to constant processes of challenge 
and renegotiation, particularly by civil society actors. Before examining this system in 
the context of Bangladesh, we need to briefly contextualise our argument within the 
country’s recent political history. During the early 1970s the country’s first Prime 
Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had initially set about building a parliamentary 
system that could bring the military and the bureaucracy under closer political control. 
However, little progress was made with institutionalising the basic principles of a 
liberal democratic state and instead Mujib maintained a personalised and centralised 
political system with a high level of “cronyism”. This was resisted by elements within 
the army that soon reasserted power and in 1975 Mujib was assassinated in a coup.  
 
Having taken back political control the military went on to rule Bangladesh for the 
rest of the 1970s and the 1980s through the regimes of Generals Ziaur Rahman (1976-
81) and H.M. Ershad (1982-90). During this period the country’s development regime 
began to shift firmly towards a market-oriented development model influenced by the 
Bretton Woods institutions. As Hossain (2017) writes, the international donors had for 
some years been pressing the government for deregulation and privatization, and the 
new military government proved receptive and ready to compromise. Zia’s 1975 
Revised Industrial Policy made a decisive break with Mujib’s state-led development 
approach, and the slow process of economic liberalization was continued under 
Ershad’s 1982 New Industrial Policy. The military regimes advised by the Bretton 
Woods institutions therefore initiated the reorientation of the country’s policy regime 
towards the market-based development path that would later gather pace during the 
post-Cold War period (Khatun 2016). Both these unelected leaders were also 
desperate to build a façade of legitimacy that could help them to sustain their regimes. 
They attempted to extend the relationship with rural elites and build limited forms of 
local democracy through sub-district level government decentralization programmes 
with local elections, but with relatively little success (Lewis 2011a). 
 
Political parties operated relatively freely during the military era, but the political 
environment was such that democratic competition was limited and unlikely to 
produce viable strategies for gaining political power. By the 1980s two main 
opposition parties, the Awami League (AL), which had been Mujib’s party and the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP, established by General Zia and now headed by 
his widow Khaleda Zia) had helped construct and lead a broad-based national 
movement that mobilized popular opposition to Ershad’s military rule through a series 
of demonstrations, strikes and rallies. Both political parties were also each beginning 
to cultivate a pyramidal system of pervasive patron-client relationships across the 
country for themselves and their allies, through which party supporters could be 
enlisted and rewarded. This began changing the nature of clientelism from a system 
that aimed to create stability to one that could now also be used to underpin a new 
patronage-based electoral politics in a post-military setting.  
 
The popular movement eventually brought down General Ershad’s regime in 1990 
through a “people power” revolution (assisted by a change of allegiance by the main 
international donors from the military to a civil administration) and a new 
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parliamentary system was put in place. This was to be based on regular elections held 
every five years, conducted under a three-month neutral “caretaker government” 
arrangement headed by a respected non-party figurehead. Relatively free and fair 
elections were duly held in 1991, contested by two main political alliances led by the 
AL and the BNP respectively. It was the latter that formed the first elected 
government under this new parliamentary system. However, the patronage structures 
built by the political parties would now form the basis for the creation of two political 
party blocs that began competing for political power under the new electoral system 
that severely limited the emergence of more than a façade of democracy. 
 
Beginning with the BNP administration that was elected in 1991 both party blocs 
would go on to alternate in winning an election and forming a government, with the 
exception of a failed election in February 1996 (initially boycotted by the AL and 
then held successfully in July) and the brief period of the “military-backed caretaker 
government” in 2006-7. However, despite national elections that were widely 
considered to have been relatively free and fair (particularly those that were held in 
1991 and 1996, with less agreement in 2001) neither party chose to behave like a 
democratic opposition after losing an election. During what Riaz (2015, p.4) terms the 
era of “hope and despair”, following each election the losing party would instead 
refuse to take up its seats in parliament, preferring to resort to extra-parliamentary 
action in the form of strike, protests and political violence to further its political goals. 
What ensued was a turbulent cycle of “illiberal democracy” based on each party 
promising and then attempting to deliver resources to supporters, but which 
nevertheless offered a form of stability based on what has been described as a system 
of “rotating plunder” (Khan 2006).  
 
The period of the military-backed caretaker government created a shift. When 
elections were finally held in late 2008 the victorious AL resolved to do away with 
the caretaker government system on the grounds that it was no longer needed to 
ensure fair elections, and replace it with an Election Commission. Events entered a 
new phase in 2013 when under this new system the AL Awami League became the 
first party to be re-elected for a second consecutive term. However, the opposition 
BNP and its allies had refused to take part in the election.2 
 
Civil society roles in representing and organising the poor 
 
Pluralistic democracy depends on the existence of multiple centres of organised 
power within a “civil society” that can enable a range of competing societal interests 
to influence government through formal and informal processes, in addition to formal 
political parties. Certain types of NGOs – along with chambers of commerce, trade 
unions, consumer groups and the like – are forms of organised interests that play 
political roles not by running directly for office or joining government, but by 
deploying resources such as money, support and status in order to exert political 
influence on behalf or members and supporters (Finer 1958).3  
 
The effort by civil society groups to capture or influence power depends on a 
collective ability to build and sustain the political parties, pressure groups, and media 
outlets that are needed to win elections and participate in day to day political 
negotiations (Faguet, 2012; Key, 1964). Economic power gives capitalist elites a 
structural advantage over subordinated classes everywhere, but popular movements 
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and civic organizations have under some conditions also been able to play significant 
roles in mobilising the poor. With appropriate support from non-state actors the poor 
can begin to free themselves from direct dependence on state or dominant economic 
elites - but only if they can access assets, build skills, and rely on the enforcement of 
proper rules. For NGOs to undertake effective social mobilisation work, success will 
depend both on their capacity to build appropriate organizational structures and to 
manage risk in the wider institutional context within which they operate.  
 
It also depends on the effectiveness of civil society groups to make claims to 
represent the poor in order to influence policy. Democratisation may offer poor 
people the formal right to access political markets, but their ability to exercise real 
political agency has always been compromised by forms of economic and social 
dependence, and by the challenges of building and sustaining autonomous 
representative organizations in civil society. While elections should enable poor 
majorities to make their rulers adopt redistributive policies, they may simply produce 
competition between political parties and elite interest groups who attempt to capture 
power or influence the way it is exercised. Indeed, competitive elections have often 
intensified adversarial conflicts and/or been manipulated and subverted by dominant 
elites (Geddes, 1994; Brett, 2014).  If both poor and rich are each able to create strong 
autonomous civil society organizations then power may simply be dispersed across 
society, “without any one force wielding excessive authority” (Truman, 1951, cited in 
Held, 1987: 191). The activities of such groups turn democratic processes into “the 
contingent outcome of interactions among a number of claims and counterclaims” 
(McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, p.268). 
 
Using a disaggregated approach to the analysis of democratic consolidation Schmitter 
(1992, p.160) argues that competition between different interest groups can produce 
complex transitional political regimes that are neither fully democratic nor 
authoritarian, since they combine both democratic and non-democratic traits. He 
argues that rather than understanding the challenge of democratic consolidation as the 
construction and identification of a single “political regime” it makes more sense to 
conceptualise a composite based on a fluid, shifting set of “partial regimes”, each of 
which distinctively organised around different sites for the representation of various 
social groups. Partial regimes are diverse institutions that link citizens to public 
authorities, each following different rules and principles - from hierarchy and 
collective bargaining to personal networks and patron-clientelism. Within partial 
regimes these groups try to resolve conflicts and issues, competing and coalescing in 
ways that depend on the levels of resources they can deploy in the effort to influence 
the political process via different forms of representation including elections, 
advocacy pressure and personal networks. In Bangladesh, the growth of “illiberal 
democracy” in the post-military era was in part a consequence of an intensification of 
the partial regime of “clientelism” across society institutions at different levels, from 
political parties to local government and village level elites. Within civil society, 
political parties have become structures for distributing patronage resources, trade 
unions have become vehicles for political party interests, and the rural poor have 
pursued patronage links with local elites over efforts to build horizontal ties of social 
solidarity and political representation. 
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Development NGOs and the radical sub-sector in Bangladesh 
 
The NGO sector in Bangladesh 
 
Bangladesh has an extensive and diverse non-governmental organization (NGO) 
sector that has been long been active in a variety of areas and activities, and has been 
widely documented. Thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of non-state actors operate 
in the country, and up to 27% of the population use their services or participate in 
their activities, more than twice the South Asian average.4 The achievements of its 
best-known organizations - such as the Grameen Bank and BRAC - have been both 
celebrated and critiqued both locally and internationally (Smillie, 2009; Karim 2010). 
The unusually high profile of the country’s NGO sector has been variously attributed 
to Bengal’s rich traditions of voluntarism and philanthropy; to local activism 
generated by the political and humanitarian crises that occurred around the period 
Bangladesh’s creation in 1971, including the November 1970 cyclone disaster, the 
war of liberation from Pakistan, and the devastating 1974 famine; and to donor 
support that was initially for relief and reconstruction and later associated with a 
commitment to democratisation, “good governance”, privatisation and “civil society” 
(Lewis 2011a). 
 
The NGO sector evolved with two main tendencies from the 1970s onwards. The 
majority of NGOs emerged as humanitarian and developmental organizations that 
were primarily focused on service delivery activities that included emergency 
response, health care, education, agricultural inputs, basic infrastructure provision, 
family planning, employment skills training, and savings and loans. There were also 
some organizations whose initial emphasis on relief and services began to evolve into 
approaches that focused on forms of political intervention including local organizing, 
awareness building around political rights, and grassroots mobilization which drew on 
both local and international traditions of organising and advocacy that aimed not only 
to meet needs but also to challenge the structural causes of poverty.5 Those who led 
and worked in these organizations were often drawn from the elites but were 
otherwise diverse, motivated by different social and political values including local or 
international traditions of philanthropy, and left-wing political ideologies drawn from 
student activism. The focus of this paper is this sub-group of NGOs, which I call the 
radical NGO sub-sector. 
 
The radical NGO sub-sector 
 
The radical NGO sub-sector in Bangladesh was composed of organizations with a 
political take on grassroots development work, along with campaigning agendas that 
aimed to influence wider structures and policy. Such NGOs can be defined as political 
organizations – as opposed to development NGOs that primarily focus on social 
welfare or service delivery - because their approach to development is driven by “a 
basic lack of faith in other classes and their institutions to work for the poor in a 
sustainable way, i.e. in a manner that changes permanently the structure of socio-
economic and political relations through which poverty is reproduced”, and by “a 
distrust of anything less than this objective as essentially charity and relief” (Wood 
1993, p.1).   
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My use of the category of a radical NGO “sub-sector” is as a loose rather than a 
tightly specified category, but one that makes it possible for us to identify and analyse 
a distinctive radical tendency found within some of Bangladesh’s leading 
development NGOs. Since there are diverse NGOs working on issues beyond 
development such as human rights or environmental issues some might argue that my 
conceptualization of the radical sub-sector is too narrow. However, my focus here is 
on the radical development NGOs that operated in the countryside rather than urban 
campaigning NGOs - such as Ain O Salish Kendra founded in 1986 and focusing on 
human rights and legal aid - though these can also be viewed as important radical 
non-state actors operating within Bangladesh’s broader civil society. 
 
The main NGOs in the sub-sector 
 
As we have seen, a range of development NGO organizations engaged in various 
forms and combinations of service delivery, advocacy and grassroots organising work 
took shape during the early years of Bangladesh’s independence. What made the 
radical sub-sector distinctive were activists who made a specific commitment to forms 
of social and political mobilization that were directed at challenging the structural 
causes of poverty and exclusion, and to what has been termed “people’s self-
development” (Rahman 1993). The main organizations are set out in Table 1. The 
evolution of this sub-sector and the main organizational players found within it can be 
briefly summarised as follows.  
 
The first recognisable NGO needs to be considered as one of the earliest members of 
the radical sub-sector, even though it is atypical, is Gonoshyastha Kendra (GK) – the 
People’s Health Centre. This was established in 1972 by Dr Zafrullah Chowdhury, a 
medic and left-wing community activist who had fought in the war against Pakistan 
and who was now working with other radical health activists to shape the new country 
through the creation of a civil society organization. By the end of the 1980s GK had 
gained a global reputation for its “barefoot doctors” paramedic health worker 
programme, its public health education campaigning, the establishment of its own 
factory to produce a range of essential drugs locally, and a well-publicised struggle to 
curb the import of non-essential drugs that remained bitterly contested by the 
international pharmaceutical companies (Chowdhury 1995). Although different from 
the other grassroots development NGOs in the sub-sector in taking a sectoral 
approach, GK forms part of the sub-sector because it was a grassroots organization 
and one explicitly concerned with challenging the power of both local and 
international political and economic interest groups and as a result encountered 
political opposition and suffered its leader has political repression. 
 
Proshika is perhaps the best known of the development NGOs that characterise the 
rest of the sub-sector, founded by two young middle class student development 
workers, Qazi Faruque Ahmed and Rahat Uddin Ahmed. R.U. Ahmed had been vice 
president of his college student union, a member of the Biplobi Chattra Union, the 
student wing of the Workers Party, and after a spell at BRAC was now was now 
working for the CUSO Training Centre. Q.F. Ahmed had gained a Masters degree in 
chemistry, had taken the civil service exams but while waiting for the results was now 
working with CUSO as a project officer. He had taken leave to work with Oxfam 
providing relief during the 1974 famine, and had become further radicalised – as we 
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will see below- by the experience of encountering mass starvation as an outcome of 
the structural causes of poverty.  
 
Table 1: Main NGOs of the radical sub-sector 
 
Name 
 
Founding Date* Main leader Focus 
Gonoshyastha 
Kendra (GK) 
1972 Dr Zafrullah 
Chowdhury 
Radical health activism, rural 
paramedic services, local essential 
drug production, advocacy. 
Proshika MUK 
 
1976 Q.F. Ahmed Group formation, social 
mobilization, popular education, 
legal aid, credit and services.  
Saptagram 
 
1976 Rokeya Rahman 
Kabeer 
Group formation, popular 
education, legal training for 
building a social movement against 
gender injustice that prioritised. 
Samata Samaj 
Samity 
 
1976 Abdul Kader Mobilizing the rural poor to access 
rights to unoccupied khas land, and 
lobbying government to better 
meet their needs. 
Association for 
Social 
Advancement 
(ASA) 
 
1978 Shafiq Choudhury Initially established as a social 
activist organization, but moved to 
credit service delivery using 
Grameen model. 
Nijera Kori (NK) 
 
1980 Khushi Kabir Initially established with a welfare 
focus, but shifted to approach 
aimed at transforming underlying 
structures of inequality, injustice 
and exclusion based on indivisible 
rights. 
Comilla Proshika 
 
1981 R.U. Ahmed Group formation, social 
mobilization, and service delivery. 
Gonoshahajjo 
Sangstha (GSS) 
 
1983 Mahmood Hasan Social mobilization and popular 
education to empower the poor to 
establish class-based organizations 
that could compete for political 
power. 
* The date given here is the formal establishment of the NGO, not the earlier initial group formation 
that subsequently evolved into the formal NGO. 
 
Formally inaugurated in 1976 as an NGO Proshika began initially as a Canadian 
University Service Overseas (CUSO) project under the Ministry of Agriculture. It 
combined service delivery work with educating, organising and mobilising of groups 
of landless rural men and women in pursuit of their rights, following a local variant of 
the Freirean approach to “conscientization”. Its name combined three Bengali words, 
proshikkhan (training), shikkha (education) and kaj (action). Q.F. Ahmed later 
reflected on the formative experience of being involved in local level relief work 
during the 1974 famine in which he experienced the exploitation of the poor by the 
rural power structure at first hand when he saw wealthy landowners withholding food 
to landless peasants:  
 
We confronted them with hundreds of hungry people. They had allowed 
people to starve when the go-downs were full. This made me realise that 
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organization was the most important thing to fight the structure of privilege, 
its power of life or death over people (Seabrook 2001, p.11)  
 
Proshika diversified its funding to include Swedish and Canadian government’s 
bilateral donors grew into one of the largest of the country’s NGOs.  
 
Differences of approach between the two founders of Proshika were gradually 
becoming apparent as the organization grew. In 1981 Proshika split into two groups, 
ostensibly because the two founders were disagreeing over whether a credit and 
savings strategy should be deployed alongside empowerment and mobilization work 
(Smillie and Hailey 2001, p.98). The result was the creation of two entirely separate 
organizations - Proshika MUK (or “Dhaka Proshika”) led by Q.F. Ahmed and 
“Comilla Proshika” led by Rahat – which agreed to operate in different areas of the 
country, with CP in the South and east and DP everywhere else (Smillie and Hailey 
2001). The split was reasonably amicable, and the precise differences of approach 
were never particularly clear and may have had more to do with leadership style than 
ideology. 
 
The origins of Samata Samaj Samity (usually just known as Samata) go back to 1976, 
but it became a formal NGO in 1983. It was initially established as a local youth 
association that was concerned with social work activities. Its staff gradually became 
more interested in political and social mobilization approaches, and the NGO began to 
focus on problems of landlessness, helping the poor access rights to unoccupied khas 
agricultural land, and persuading the government to better meet people’s needs and 
rights in its working areas (Devine 2002).6 It was initially established in the North 
west of the country as a youth club in Jaybash village that was called Jaybash Jubok 
Samity (JJS). The local youth who founded the group were motivated “a desire to 
compete with the privileged youth of Kurigram”, the local town, who had privileged 
access to local resources such as the playing field, and the group also began 
undertaking small scale local relief and welfare activities.  
 
By 1978 this had morphed into a development group named Samata Samaj Kallayan 
Samity, led by Abdul Kader, a local schoolteacher. This was a local grassroots 
development organization that began to work towards transformation of Jaybash into 
a model village based on building local cooperation and modernising agriculture. 
However, in the attempt to link with the government’s rural cooperative programme 
the group soon realised that the resources available were captured by local elites. This 
experience, alongside contact with some Oxfam workers, helped shape a more radical 
activist emphasis on redistribution and the need to challenge local elites. In 1983 it 
became a formal registered NGO as Samata – led by Kader - and over time it 
developed an approach to organise and settle landless people on khas land, along with 
provision of training credit and savings. For example 1400 landless households were 
settled on land in Pabna district in 1997 (IPS 1997, Devine 2000). 
 
Women’s rights were critical to the founding ideologies and approaches of several 
organizations in the sub-sector. For example, Saptagram was established in to 
empower “rural women through a social movement against gender injustice that 
prioritised, but was not limited to landless women”. It focused on group formation, 
popular education and legal training to strengthen women’s “capacity to analyse, 
question and act on the structures of gender injustice in their lives” (Kabeer and Huq 
 10 
2010, p.81). Saptagram was set up in Faridpur in 1976 as an organization run by and 
for women, which was unique for the time. A feminist and class perspective informed 
its founding principles and it aimed to organise women, provide legal training to 
promote action on gender injustice (as well as savings activities to improve economic 
security). Charismatic and able to infuse the organization with power to challenge 
power holders in government and in the local community this proved double-edged 
such that "the failure to build a second line of leadership to take over the directorship 
was widely attributed to the force of her personality" (p.82). Nijera Kori (NK) – 
which means “we do it ourselves” – also began as a welfare-orientated women’s NGO 
during the early 1970s, but by 1980 had evolved into a political organization of “men 
and women working with both men and women”. Its aim is to transform underlying 
structures of inequality, injustice and exclusion and asserts the indivisibility of 
economic, social and political rights (Kabeer, 2003, p. 9).  
 
Finally, GSS was established in 1983 by activists who had been shaped by Bengali 
nationalism and concern for human rights of poor. The early focus by its founders was 
to build relationships with the rural poor men using adult literacy classes, and later for 
women. Gender and class issues were raised through the use of specialised content, 
often using night schools. There was a focus on the causes of poverty, an analysis 
within local and international structures, and a critique of top down state policy and 
elites, etc. (Wood 1993). GSS also had a charismatic leader in the form of Marxist 
activist Mahmood Hasan who aimed to build an organization that could support and 
empower the poor to establish class-based organizations that could eventually 
compete for political power. Like some other radical development NGOs (such as 
NK) it viewed micro-credit organizations negatively as offering an individualistic 
approach to social change that only served to undermine solidaristic horizontal forms 
of grassroots social mobilization (Hashemi 1995). 
 
Operating primarily in rural areas in village settings, many of these organizations 
promoted a “social mobilization” approach that was influenced not just by left politics 
and peasant struggle but also by the radical educational ideas of Paolo Freire and Ivan 
Illich.7 These ideas centred on processes of “self-reflected learning” rather than 
teaching (Rahman 1993, p.5) and the need to re-conquer knowledge and build pro-
poor organization to overcome the “structural ignorance” that stopped assetless 
people from acquiring any knowledge of their rights (Nebelung 1991). The aim was 
to generate an interactive process of reflection and action between peasants and NGO 
workers to understand and transform the status quo. Q.F. Ahmed (1992: vi) executive 
director of Proshika, explained this as: 
 
a process of heightening their consciousness about the forces of 
underdevelopment, developing their material autonomy, and increasing 
their participation so that they assume more control of their life and 
livelihood.  
 
Such ideas complemented other influential “alternative development” approaches that 
were emerging at the time, including gender activism and women’s rights, 
participatory action and reflection (PAR), participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and 
rights-based development (Lewis 2014). 
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Another key motivation among NGO activist leaders in the sub-sector was the 
strategic adoption of the NGO form rather than that of other kinds of civic 
organizations, which they believed would enable them to escape the limits imposed 
on open political competition by the military regime. They believed that direct 
involvement in competitive party politics would not promote poverty-focused social 
change, because mainstream parties had been compromised both by their links to the 
military and increasingly by their reliance on vertically integrated patronage systems 
for their operation. They hoped to generate a non-party, but politically-engaged, 
development practice that would strengthen grassroots organizations, build bottom-up 
demand for better services and political inclusion as well as the formation of social 
and political, or class, consciousness. As Hashemi and Hasan (1999, p.130) put it, 
these activists  
 
upheld the vision of the political left, but with the necessary caveat that the 
leftist organizational form was inadequate, and that left-wing political parties 
were unable to deliver … [and] alienated from the everyday problems of the 
poor. 
 
This led to the adoption of three inter-related approaches - grassroots mobilization, 
where NGOs formed and worked with village level groups of mainly landless men 
and women8; followed by a bridging approach linking such groups into wider 
networks and federations in order to facilitate coordinated action within civil society; 
and “policy advocacy” where the NGO itself tried to influence government policies in 
favour of the poor. For example, Proshika MUK’s work included mobilising landless 
groups of men and women to secure contested rights over land, raising awareness to 
resist the practice of dowry, and providing support to labourers to manage collective 
negotiations for fairer pay for contract labour (Kramsjo and Wood, 1992). 
 
The sub-sector was a diverse group, and contained organizations that over time 
changed their approaches dramatically. For example, the Association for Social 
Advancement (ASA) had initially been set up in 1978 with a radical social activist 
focus but by the late 1980s was on a trajectory that led it away from the sub-sector 
towards the mainstream. Finding limited success with its social mobilisation work it 
began a tilt towards microfinance activities centred on an approach to lending that its 
leadership began adapting from the Grameen Bank’s model. This organizational 
journey was primarily driven by the NGO’s own organizational imperatives rather 
than by the donors (Rutherford 2009). Nevertheless, most of the mainstream 
international development donors were more comfortable with supporting 
development NGOs focused on service delivery than those in the radical sub-sector.  
 
In the next section we consider the shifting fortunes of these organizations in the 
context of Bangladesh’s changing politics.  
 
 
The record of the radical NGO sub-sector 
 
Experiences during the military period 
 
The radical sub-sector came into existence during the military government period, 
which was an era characterised by uneasy coexistence between government and 
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NGOs. By the end of the 1980s the government had created an NGO Affairs Bureau 
(NGOAB) to control flows of foreign funding to NGOs and coordinate and control 
their activities. Relations with government veered between periods of partnership, 
tension and conflict. However, there were periods of relatively stable collaboration in 
service delivery and Bangladesh’s NGO sector expanded and became more 
established. Blair (2001) commented that NGOs generally “concentrated on their 
developmental work rather than outright political agendas, partly owing to what was 
surely a well-founded fear (particularly during the Ershad years) that political 
involvement would bring repression from the regime” (p.187). The mobilization 
approach was discouraged through the political efforts of the Ziaur Rahman and H.M. 
Ershad regimes, and by the policies of the mainstream international donors who 
generally favoured economic growth, infrastructure support and agricultural 
modernization over social justice agendas (Kabeer 2003).  
 
The efforts of citizens to build organizations to contribute to development work, and 
the availability of resources from international donors were key drivers of NGO 
emergence during the 1970s and 1980s. But NGOs – even those of the radical sub-
sector - also grew during this era in part because the military hoped to use them to 
legitimise itself (Wood 2009), and assist in efforts to bypass excluded elites and limit 
the growth of local-level political opposition. Both Ershad and Ziaur Rahman (his 
predecessor) had made efforts to create a transition from military regime to more 
legitimate civilian governments, and both created new political parties that they hoped 
would further this aim. Even radical NGOs were in some cases tolerated during the 
military period helped by personal networks among reform-minded elites like the 
close friendship between the head of a local NGO and the Ministry of Land chief, and 
by the government’s occasional attempts to build support by attempting high profile 
“populist” reforms. 
 
Organizations such as Proshika continued to pursue radical grassroots approaches 
despite the unpredictability of government attitudes to the development NGOs (Wood 
and Kramsjo 1992). Samata too was beginning to have some success with its social 
mobilization approach, concentrating on addressing landlessness among the rural poor 
by organizing around the need to secure the rights to local unoccupied agricultural  
khas land. The government had in theory allocated this land to local landless farmers, 
but it was frequently illegally occupied by local elites who undermined attempts to 
develop horizontal forms of collective resistance by providing workers with jobs on 
this land in return for political loyalty that strengthened patron-client relationships. 
During local elections held under military rule in 1985 Samata, which had 12,000 
members at the time and was seen as a potential source of votes by political 
candidates, refused to endorse the ruling party candidate who had “won” the election 
and as a result was subjected to serious reprisals (Devine 2006). 
 
By the end of the 1980s evidence was leading some to question the idea that NGO 
mobilisation strategies were achieving their political goals at the grassroots level. It 
was difficult for radical NGOs to build and sustain horizontal ties within rural 
societies that were primarily vertically structured, and when groups were successfully 
created, it was even more difficult to deal with the violent repercussions that 
sometimes followed from confrontation with the local power structure. For example, 
during the late 1980s in Tangail District, Proshika MUK’s efforts to organise and 
mobilise marginalised rural women in forest dwelling communities in order to 
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challenge corrupt government Forest Department officials and their local 
intermediaries in order to gain access to local forest resources resulted only in 
confrontation. The local power structure easily asserted itself over these local claims 
and this led Proshika to reflect and reconsider its strategy that evolved eventually into 
a “social forestry” approach that was less confrontational, based around protection of 
the forest against illegal felling in collaboration with officials (Khan et al. 1993).  
 
The continuing strength of rural elites and their control of local resources gave a 
resilience to existing structures and institutions that limited the ability of the 
mobilization approach to challenge “the net” and achieve the ambitious empowerment 
agenda that motivated its founders (Hashemi 1990). As Nebelung (1987,p.133) wrote 
from a field study of social mobilization NGOs undertaken during the mid-1980s in 
northern Bangladesh radical NGO impacts tended to be piecemeal and easily 
contested: “From time to time one may find holes in it; scattered holes that can at 
present be easily mended because they do not jeopardise the very existence and unity 
of the net”. When it came to conscientization impacts, Hashemi (1990) reported that 
while peoples’ awareness had often been increased through NGO efforts around 
health and nutrition issues, there was little evidence that NGOs were succeeding in 
engaging assetless people in discussions about the roots of poverty and inequality. 
 
While such NGOs had initially encouraged their grassroots groups to confront and 
challenge local vested interests, S.A. Khan (1989) observed that some were now 
gradually moving towards forms of “reformist activism” that no longer centred on 
structural change. Instead there was emphasis on lobbying for stronger rights to 
allocated resources and services: 
 
It has been extremely difficult to organise landless groups and to encourage 
them to maintain their class solidarity, and there are no signs of spontaneous 
reproduction of such groups (Khan, 1989, p.55) 
 
Such experiences led some organizations to make drastic reassessments of their 
approach. For example as mentioned earlier the initially radical NGO ASA made an 
abrupt break with mobilization and collective action approaches in 1991 after “local 
staff reported that members find financial and employment problems much more 
pressing than political ones, and constantly ask for loans” (Rutherford 2009, p.74). As 
a consequence, Rutherford reports – perhaps somewhat dismissively - that ASA 
“stopped pretending to be a ‘people’s organization’ and settled down as a 
conventional NGO” (p.77). Today ASA is regarded as one of the world’s leading 
microfinance institutions. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, there were nevertheless some radical NGO advocacy successes 
in terms of representing the poor and influencing government policy at the centre. 
This arose from forms of “top down” NGO advocacy and reformist elite networking 
rather than social mobilisation. For example General Ershad’s 1987 Land Reform 
Action Programme (LRAP) created a mechanism for NGOs to be represented in a 
khas land reform policy coalition. This made it possible for landless farmers to take 
possession of land allocated to them by government and “retain ownership and use of 
that same land” (Devine 2002, p.406):  
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Having assumed power in 1981, Ershad spent the best part of his time 
desperately trying to win legitimacy and credibility for his regime both at 
home and abroad. The [Land Reform Action Programme] initiative was 
one of the many attempts engineered by Ershad to win popular support. 
For NGOs therefore, the opportunity to participate in the [Land Reform 
Cell] was embedded in very specific conditions of co-optation.  
 
A second example was GK’s work in the health sector, where it drew on academics 
and activists on an advisory committee to persuade the military government to initiate 
a National Drugs Policy. This was progressive in that it emphasised generics, 
regulated imports, eliminated unnecessary combinations of drugs, and restricted 
pharmaceutical advertising. The policy was briefly celebrated internationally as an 
example for the rest of the developing world. However, political pressure from hostile 
national and international interest groups first diluted then side-lined the policy 
(Chowdhury 1995). Finally, a third case was when Nijera Kori and other groups 
played a leading role in resisting the donor-driven top-down Flood Action Plan 
infrastructure initiative that had been launched in 1988. This technocratic mega-
project was widely opposed on technical, political, social and environmental grounds 
by many non-governmental groups. The project was abandoned during the early 
1990s following action from a broad coalition of local activists, national civil society 
organizations and international groups (Blair 2001; Kabeer 2003).  
 
However, personalised NGO strategies for policy advocacy and engagement with 
government also carried significant risks. GK’s leader took up an advisory position 
within the Ershad military government in an effort to further the essential drugs 
strategy, when the mass movement for democracy was at its height. He suffered 
reputational costs when he was roundly criticised by former colleagues in the NGO 
community, especially those in the radical sub-sector. This was a sign of things to 
come. Despite operating in a democratic environment that might have been expected 
to favour civil society activism there was more tension during the 1990s between 
NGOs and government than there had been in the 1980s.  
 
From 1987 onwards, Ershad’s government increasingly began to face broad-based 
unrest around the country. Political parties, student groups, public sector employees 
and professional associations grew into a broad-based popular opposition movement 
(gono andolan) to military rule. Military rule in Bangladesh was peacefully 
overthrown in 1990 when the movement for democracy brought the authoritarian 
government of General H.M. Ershad to an end and replaced it with a parliamentary 
system with regular elections. During these events the development NGO community 
had largely remained in the background without playing a major role in the 
movement, and their position received criticism from some quarters. Only shortly 
before Ershad’s regime fell in December 1990 did some of the development NGOs 
join, briefly opening up a broader political civil society alliance. 
 
Experiences during the electoral democracy period 
 
New elections were held in 1991 under a neutral “caretaker government” 
arrangement, and Bangladesh entered what many people hoped would be a period of 
democratic renewal. It began well with relatively free and fair elections that produced 
a BNP government, followed by elections in 1996 that led to a government being 
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formed by the opposition Awami League. What Sobhan (2004) terms a “bipolar” 
political system had become established which ensured that both main political parties 
were able to secure power after general elections held every five years, at least up 
until 2007, “ensuring both competition as well as unpredictability in the outcome of 
the next election (p.4102).  
 
However, as we have seen, this was a system that rested on political parties investing 
in patron-client relationships that produced the instability and violence that led 
Bangladesh’s political system to be termed an “illiberal democracy”. This has 
endured as a duopolistic system that carries a severe cost in terms of the two main 
parties’ insensitivity to smaller political parties and to accountability to voters. It is 
one “that has eroded pluralism as well as challenge within the political system which 
has contributed to the emergence of structural weakness within the two parties as well 
as reduced the choices available to the electorate” (p.4103). Each successive elected 
government has – in the words of Quadir (2015) “concentrated on consolidating their 
power base by defying the procedural norms of liberal democracy” (p.7). What might 
have been expected to be a positive environment for the radical NGO sub-sector to 
take forward a civil society based project for grassroots democratization and social 
justice turned into a far more complex and difficult set of challenges.  
 
During the 1990s use was made of the recently created NGOAB to manage the NGO 
sector politically, by encouraging apolitical development activities and punishing 
NGOs that had displayed signs of supporting the opposition or alternative policies. In 
1992, for example, the NGOAB field a report to the Prime Minister asserting that 
NGO activities were “anti-state and dangerous” and attempted to cancel the operating 
license of the NGO umbrella organization in the country (Hashemi 1995, p.104). This 
was an uneasy period for the radical NGO sub-sector, as the neo-liberal development 
paradigm gained ground and mainstream NGO microcredit and service delivery work 
became the predominant approach supported by both government and donors 
(Muhammad, 2015). 
 
The post-military and post-Cold War era also created a more complex international 
aid environment that impacted upon the NGO community. On the one hand, the “new 
policy agenda” (Edwards and Hulme 1992) that was now being pursued by the 
mainstream donor community claimed to place civil society and democratization at its 
centre, alongside economic liberalization, seeking “to define NGOs through a lens of 
democratic governance with a neoliberal market philosophy” (Mannan, 2015, p.7). 
This served to “depoliticise” development with reforms that aimed to reduce the role 
of the state, and strengthen the role of autonomous for-profit and civic organizations 
as service-delivery agencies. It led to increased financial support for development 
NGOs through the creation of new forms of government “contracting” arrangements, 
often funded extensively by donors and in sectors such as family planning services 
and agriculture. This contributed further to the marginalisation of political grassroots 
organising by NGOs. Paradoxically, electoral competition also increased the potential 
political influence of some radical NGOs, who became more involved in voter 
education, rights awareness work and even supporting and preparing local candidates 
from among marginalised groups to stand in local elections (such as GSS in 1992, see 
below).  
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There was also in some quarters lingering suspicion of NGOs among the new political 
leadership who believed that some civil society leaders had become too close to the 
earlier military government (Hashemi 1995). They set about “reassessing” NGO 
relations guided by a new mainstream policy discourse that involved terms like 
government-NGO “complementarity”, and “collaboration”. This was primarily 
motivated by bureaucratic imperatives and the need to maintain political control. For 
government and for donors the vogue for NGO “partnership” mainly took the form of 
sub-contracting relationships in service delivery in keeping with the neoliberal vision 
of functional division of labour between government and NGOs, rather than one 
embodying creative synergy. For example, the government’s Fifth Five Year Plan 
(1997-2002) enshrined the idea of NGO-government collaboration in a range of 
sectors, including health, nutrition and family planning. The implementation of the 
Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Project (which was supported by World Bank and 
UNICEF) was typical of this new approach to formal partnership between the 
government and NGOs. This produced a more conventional accommodation – or 
perhaps a “reluctant partnership” (Farrington and Bebbington 1993) – between NGOs 
and government that was to some extent at least intended to designed to demobilise 
the activities of the radical sub-sector. 
 
The return to democracy should have ushered in a new golden age for NGO political 
activity, particularly since it resonated with this new international post Cold War 
policy agenda that emphasised  “good governance” and “civil society”. However, this 
was not to be the case. For example, while had GSS begun positioning itself at the 
forefront of the radical sub-sector and was eager to embrace opportunities to engage 
with democratization from below, its strategy did not go according to plan. In 1992, 
around 400 GSS members ran for posts in local sub-district council elections and over 
250 were elected (Fernando 2011). However, many were immediately subject to 
harassment. For example, GSS supported members drawn from the poorest landless 
class in the local sub-district council elections in five areas of the Northern district of 
Nilphamari. GSS candidates stood on an independent “organizations of the poor” 
ticket, rather than for a political party (Hashemi 1995). The elections were staggered 
over several days. The NGO candidates won seats in the first of these elections, but 
these gains produced an immediate backlash when local elites hired violent thugs to 
attack the NGO’s members and its property. The government failed to defend them 
and even instructed the police to file charges against some of the NGO members and 
staff.  
 
Challenging the power structure, as research findings of The Net (1980) had 
predicted, therefore posed significant problems for radical NGOs. Elites continued to 
tolerate NGOs only up to the point that they became involved in formal political 
processes and party politics. Such incidents as Nilphamari persuaded some of the 
NGOs in the radical sub-sector to “sanitise their activities (if not their rhetoric)” 
(p.107) by concentrating more fully on the delivery of economic assistance. GSS 
continued to operate and had received more than US $25m from international donors 
between 1995 and 1997. However, a state investigation claimed to have found 
evidence of financial irregularities and misuse of donor funds, though this was never 
completely substantiated. The government took over the organization after complaints 
from its employees were made to the NGO Affairs Bureau, and it lost its status as a 
major NGO player and began a slow decline.  
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As the profile of development NGOs increased, this period also saw growing criticism 
of NGOs in the local media. These criticisms centred on allegations of wastefulness, a 
perception of lavish donor-funded lifestyles led their staff, and in some cases of 
outright corruption. The “political” NGOs were also accused of “crowding out” other 
forms of radical politics. Left political parties had long suggested that NGO work was 
damaging the efforts of radical political parties to build rural social movements and 
political organization and this was seen as having depoliticising effects on rural 
peasant struggle. In 1989, The Dhaka Courier weekly had begun a critical debate on 
the NGO phenomenon that included this and other critiques. The left’s agenda was 
slowing fading as the neoliberal model of development was asserted during the post-
Cold War years. Fernando (2011: 219) goes as far as to suggest that during the 1990s 
“the entire political left was absorbed by the NGO sector”. 
 
The mainstream parties were also feeling threatened by the some forms of radical 
NGO mobilisation, fearing that NGOs might come to play greater political roles in 
society and even become a new political force, and a threat to their ability to retain 
control. As Hashemi (1995: 105) has argued:  
 
Most development NGOs have been explicit in foregoing the roles of 
political parties – i.e., competing for political power at the level of state 
authority. However, when NGOs analyse poverty in terms of structural 
causes and define their objectives in terms of structural transformation, 
they intervene directly within the political space that defines the status 
quo. In doing so, development NGOs are clearly “political”.  
 
In 2001, for example, Proshika MUK was successful in helping to build a left alliance 
involving trade unions, the press, and women’s organizations that had succeeded in 
mobilizing more than half a million people in support of democratization, poverty 
reduction and human rights in a “United Civil Society Movement” (Oikabaddo 
Nagorik Andolan), during a brief period of successful political coalition building. 
 
The decline of the radical sub-sector and the NK “exception” 
 
Today’s NGO sector in Bangladesh bears little trace of the radical NGO sub-sector 
we have discussed in this paper. These types of large scale radical development 
NGOs as “social mobilisation organizations have all but disappeared” (Kabeer 2010 
et al: 47). What happened? In this section we briefly update the organizational 
histories of the key NGO actors.  
 
The first of the radical development NGOs to experience problems was Comilla 
Proshika, already struggling by the late 1980s. At its height in the mid-1980s Comilla 
had employed over 200 field staff and worked with 1200 rural groups comprising 
65,000 people in the eastern region of the country (see Lewis 2017, forthcoming). By 
the late 1980s the organization had expanded and power had become further 
concentrated in the hands of its charismatic, non-accountable executive director. 
There was only weak formal accountability to the board in the form of a fourteen-
person Governing Body that only had seven members, five of whom were staff who 
also sat on the Management Committee. A key senior manager resigned in 1988 in 
order to stand as a candidate in local elections for the ruling military party, which was 
controversial for many others in the organization. There were also reports that 
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financial inconsistencies were discovered in office accounts, suggesting that resources 
might have been misused to support political activities like siting tube wells on the 
land of local elites.  
 
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Comilla Proshika’s main 
donor, carried out a major evaluation that produced a damning report (CIDA 1990) 
that was impossible to ignore. The report stated that “leadership within the MC and 
the GB appears to be largely provided by one person – the ED” (p.12). It also 
suggested that the organization’s often proclaimed radical edge had now become 
blunted. The dual approach described as “mobilization with services” was now 
described as amounted to little more than a traditional training and credit provision 
programme. Despite the NGO’s leadership rhetoric, there was “little evidence that 
groups are nowadays actively seeking to identify the causes of their poverty” (p.111). 
Most damning perhaps was the suggestion that the NGO now “follows an elitist rather 
than a participatory model of development” (p.119). CIDA made several attempts to 
persuade the organization to reform, but then eventually withdrew its support. 
Comilla Proshika had therefore lost its major source of funding and alienated the 
government and sections of the development community. The authors of the report 
were also concerned about these problems being compounded by authoritarian 
leadership, weak administration and the fact that of the leadership were developing 
dubious political linkages. On a smaller scale, Saptagram had also fallen into decline 
by the late 1990s for mainly organizational reasons. The charismatic leadership style 
of its founder made it difficult to build second tier leaders, tensions among staff and 
members coming from very different backgrounds, and increase donor funding 
generated by its success that produced disruptive pressures caused by rapid 
organizational growth (Kabeer and Huq 2010).  
 
The challenges of implementing a radical civil society strategy in the wider context of 
a partial democracy that relied on forms of political patronage were most clearly 
exposed by the decline of Proshika MUK. By the 1990s Proshika had become 
Bangladesh’s second largest NGO (after BRAC). Its leader had long taken a tough 
anti-fundamentalist confrontational line with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), 
and its alliance with the Jama’at-i-Islami Islamists, and its president had become 
associated with the Awami League party. The Oikabaddo Nagorik Andolan coalition 
that Proshika had helped assemble in 2001, as we saw, had unsettled the government. 
When a BNP coalition government was elected in late 2001 several NGOs including 
Proshika began to pay the price for what had been viewed as political partisanship in 
the period running up to the election when it had advised its members not to vote for 
the BNP alliance. The new government began to pursue what its staff felt was a 
vendetta against the organization, blocking funds that were due from donors and 
arresting some of its senior staff following accusations of financial irregularities.  
 
The allegations began to affect Proshika’s relationship with the donors as well, some 
of whom complained that it had infringed the “no party politics” rule that tacitly 
underpinned donor relationships with NGOs (Lewis 2010). Perceived closeness to the 
AL also began to undermine its leader’s status among the wider NGO community. 
The Proshika President’s term as chair of the Association of Development Agencies 
of Bangladesh (ADAB) had further contributed to the NGO’s problems. He was 
accused by government (and some NGO members) of politicising ADAB - 
supposedly an impartial NGO network for coordination and exchange of ideas – by 
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splitting it along partisan lines, and of favouring certain client NGOs with ADAB 
funding and capacity building support. Finally, the political ambitions of Proshika’s 
President, who unsuccessfully stood for election as an MP in 2008 following the 
military-based caretaker government, further contributed to the organization’s 
problems. By the end of the decade, Proshika had lost much of its funding, split into 
opposing and sometimes violent factions, and entered a long period of decline. 
 
Samata, despite meeting with the resistance to its land occupations discussed earlier, 
managed to grow during the 1990s. It continued to settle landless people on khas land, 
but also attempted to secure better representation and fairer outcomes for women in 
dispute settlement through its work with local institutions such traditional village 
courts (salish). By the middle of the 2000s there was evidence that such efforts were 
gaining traction in some local areas where Samata had been particularly active, such 
as Faridpur and Rajbari districts (Lewis and Hossain 2008). However, Samata too fell 
prey to problems of alleged malfeasance among its leadership in 2008 when it lost its 
bilateral funding from UK, Norway and Sweden following an independent forensic 
audit that showed evidence of misuse and misappropriation of funds. Today the 
organization continues to operate on a reduced scale and faces a highly uncertain 
future. 
 
As the AL government has consolidated its power in government it has become less 
tolerant of a diverse development NGO community. Recent years have seen a 
narrowing of civil society space in Bangladesh in the mainstream as well as the 
radical sub-sector, with even the internationally celebrated Grameen Bank facing 
problems in its relations with the government.9 The radical NGO sub-sector mainly 
survives today to support rights-based development and gender empowerment. Nijera 
Kori remains the most significant player in the sub-sector. It has built an effective 
system of internal democracy into its organizational structures and systems, avoided 
the pitfalls of charismatic leadership, and resisted donor offers to support unrealistic 
expansion and/or to shift its focus away from mobilization work.  
 
Kabeer et al (2010, p.45) found that social mobilisation NGOs such as NK could still 
produce positive political effects and change women’s lives despite earlier setbacks. 
The evidence shows that NGO strategies had played an important role in politicising 
their members and building “their willingness and capacity to engage actively in the 
domain of policy and politics” and that “development NGOs expand the sphere of 
chosen rather than given relationships in the lives of sizeable numbers of poor women 
and men in Bangladesh. This is of particular significance for women who are far more 
likely than men to be confined to the ascribed communities of family and kin”.  
 
Such approaches have strengthened women’s capabilities including their “analytical 
skills, dignity and sense of worth” and “knowledge of rights, awareness of social 
injustice and the collective willingness to challenge it on behalf of self and others”: 
 
In building these capabilities, social mobilisation organizations have 
helped to transform their members from the clients of the rich and 
powerful into citizens willing to engage with the structures of power and 
to stand up for the rights of the poor. If the abysmal quality of 
governance in Bangladesh is to ever improve, it will be through the 
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construction of these kinds of citizenship, these “habits of the heart”, on 
a national scale.  
 
The experience of NK can be understood as representing what Gerring (2007) calls a 
“deviant case” because it offers insights into factors that have determined outcomes 
that are significantly different from the broader population of radical NGOs. In 
another study of the same organization (Kabeer et al., 2009), the authors are able to 
marshal convincing qualitative and quantitative evidence that its work has not only 
achieved valuable progress, but that its experience can also offer a model for 
rethinking mainstream approaches: 
 
NK members were more likely than others in our study to know their 
constitutional rights, to vote, to campaign in local and national elections 
and to interact with locally elected representatives and government 
officials. They were more likely to be elected to informal village 
committees, to be called to participate in shalishes [informal village 
councils] held by local elites or the upazila chairman as well as to initiate 
their own shalish.  
 
Members were also more likely to be consulted by other people within their 
community to get advice or for their opinion. Drawing a direct link of 
continuity back to the earlier emphasis of the radical NGO sub-sector in the 
1970s and 1980s, it was also found that NK members were more likely to have 
taken part in forms of collective action for themselves and/or others, including 
to protest the unfair distribution of government social resources, to contest 
land rights, to protest against violence against women, and to engage in 
collective wage bargaining. The evidence suggested finally that those who 
were members of NK “were more critical of both traditional power structures 
as well as corrupt local officials” (p.46). 
 
Thus while most radical NGOs did not justify their claims, we should not write off the 
NGO contribution altogether. As Mannan (2015: 39) has suggested “NGOs have 
clearly contributed to the changing of hierarchical and community values in rural 
Bangladeshi society, but not without considerable resistance.” Committed and well-
managed agencies could “make a difference” despite the difficult political 
environment in which they operated. 
 
 
Explaining the decline 
 
The next section explains the general decline of the sub-sector by focusing on three 
inter-related factors: (i) an institutional setting dominated by clientelistic structures 
that have undermined efforts to build horizontal alliances among excluded groups in 
civil society, or links between NGOs and political parties; (ii) a shift in donor support 
from mobilization to market-based service delivery agencies; and (iii) internal 
structures that have generated legitimacy and accountability problems by encouraging 
elite capture, co-option and personalised leadership in the radical sub-sector in 
particular. 
 
Institutional setting: the challenge of clientelistic democracy 
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A deeply entrenched system of clientelistic institutions exists in Bangladesh that 
Wood (2003), following Goffman (1961), describes as a “total institution”. This 
system constrains most people within enclosed, tightly structured lives where 
participation in the patronage system over-determines everyday struggles over 
identities, rights and livelihoods. This perspective perhaps over-states the rigidity of 
the system, since as Gay (1998) has argued, clientelism is not fixed or static but 
subject to continual change and renegotiation. Yet while NGO attempts to “represent 
the poor” challenge the dominant political elite’s claim to represent all its citizens, 
they also led poor people to treat their relationships with NGOs as an instrumental 
rather than ethical relationship, determined by what “they have to offer, and what will 
they want in return” (White, 1999: 311). At the same time, NGOs’ ability to mobilise 
aid and deliver pro-poor services earned them the tolerance of the military regime 
since they did not threaten its political authority (and may have even occasionally 
helped to legitimise it), but later on their ability to mobilise support and influence 
elections posed a greater threat to the competing elites that controlled the bi-polar 
political system based on the two dominant political parties and their shifting 
coalitions.  
 
Competitive clientelism therefore created a political settlement based on a pyramidal 
structure threatened by antagonistic competition between party elites and their 
supporters (Khan 2000). The parties did not offer distinct political agendas but 
operated as vehicles for elite competition by distributing resources and enforcing 
loyalty to their patronage networks using strategies of co-option, violent intimidation 
and vote buying (Lewis 2004). NGOs, trade unions, activist groups, social 
movements, think tanks and donors needed to distance themselves from these 
structures if they were to create a pluralist civil society envisaged by neo-Toquevillian 
theorists. However, they mostly lacked internal democratic decision-making 
structures, and none could retain their autonomy by escaping the demands of the 
dominant elites. Even apparently radical interventions by labour unions were 
undermined by these tendencies, so: 
 
union members become entangled in promoting the priorities of this or 
that party by supporting its hartals, attending its rallies and intimidating 
opposition candidates and voters at election time. In return, they are 
rewarded with patronage jobs in the party and trade union movement.  
(Stiles 2002: 841)  
  
Thus NGOs in Bangladesh operate in what Douglass North called a “natural state”, 
where “organizations are not free of the state, whether represented by key overbearing 
individual rulers/personalities, or by a more generalized social persona or political 
class—or more likely a mix of both” (2015, p.21). They cannot escape local cultures 
of power or the tendency for their own leaders to use their resources to create their 
own clientelistic networks in which “those seeking [their] support … aim to contrive a 
personal relationship, in the context of which they can advance their specific claim” 
(White 1999, p.315).  
 
These dysfunctional relationships do not rule out all possibilities of positive 
engagement, and effective action as we have seen, but they do expose the serious 
limitations imposed on the impact of democratic reforms in clientelistic states.  
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Resource flows: donor dependence and changing priorities 
 
The salience of formal NGOs as development and advocacy organizations during the 
neo-liberal era is heavily dependent on attempts by foreign donors to find non-state 
and non-partisan agencies to implement their pro-poor policy agendas. This has 
enabled activists to overcome the budget constraint that usually undermines the 
activities of radical organizations, and did enable some of them to play a positive role 
during the military and early democratic eras. However, the subsequent decline of 
such organizations also raises difficult questions about the role of aid and donor 
interventions in contested political contexts.  
 
“Progressive” donors have been attempting to support participatory development and 
empowerment since the 1990s. Their interventions do not raise heavily contested 
issues when they are focused on services and livelihoods, but they must do so when 
they include an overt political agenda since donors are not supposed to participate in 
partisan political processes. The absence of a strong domestic social democratic party 
in the country meant that radical NGOs also needed to distance themselves from 
national parties and electoral processes, but this also limited their ability to promote 
the political interests of their beneficiaries. Lavalle et al (2005) found that citizens in 
Brazil could only influence politics when they participated in civil society 
organizations and not as individuals. But they also found that these civil society 
organizations could only generate transformative actions when they were linked to 
political parties, rather than by remaining independent from them as much 
mainstream civil society theory assumes. In Bangladesh attempts by radical NGO 
leaders to enter mainstream politics, or by activists to contest local elections not only 
intensified opposition from competing local elites, but also undermined relationships 
between donors and the state. 
 
These problems together with a decline in radical politics in the Western donor 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s also produced a shift in support from mobilization to 
development NGOs (Stiles, 2002,) but this does not explain their long-term decline. 
Instead, some donors like the UK Department for International Development (DFID) 
in the UK actually wanted them to “scale-up”, and increased funding to levels that 
produced problems of rapid organizational growth that not only affected Proshika, 
GSS and Samata, as we saw, but also the UK voluntary sector more widely (Billis and 
McKeith 1995). However, these organizations need not have given way to these 
pressures. Nijera Kori did resist donor demands to shift towards a service delivery 
approach and what became referred to locally in pejorative terms as the micro-credit 
“paisha10 capitalism”. NK stuck instead to a strategy to keep working on a “shoe 
string budget”, to avoid the major large funding agencies, and to secure a series of 
smaller grants from non-mainstream donors such as international solidarity-focused 
NGOs in order to build like-minded partnerships that served the interests of NK and 
its members (Kabeer 2003, p.3).11 
 
Donor funding also diluted NGO accountability to their beneficiaries by providing 
their leaders with a secure income and privileged lifestyle and the ability to build 
clientelistic networks of their own. These leaders were not subjected to elections or to 
market completion, so only the donors could monitor and evaluate their actions and 
sanction poor performance, which they were usually unable to do very effectively 
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(Brett, 1993). The donors did eventually desert GSS, both Proshikas and Samata, but 
only long after these organizations had lost their credibility and legitimacy.  
 
Internal structures: authoritarian leadership and elite capture  
 
Leadership problems are endemic in NGOs but are particularly acute in radical 
organizations. Leaders are expected to identify with the poor but NGOs are managed 
by privileged elites that lead separate lives, have levels of education and income that 
differentiate them from their beneficiaries, and must manage complex processes that 
force them to make difficult compromises with governments, donors and private 
firms. Even leaders that are driven by ethical obligation rather than self-interest often 
make unpopular or ineffectual decisions, while opportunistic leaders can easily 
exploit their privileges for personal gain. Critical theorists have attempted to 
overcome these problems by “putting people in control” but even radical 
organizations depend on centralised control and informed leaderships, and 
participatory management tends to impose impossible costs on staff and demands on 
the poor (Brett, 2003).  
 
The gap that exists between leaders and beneficiaries creates real possibilities of elite 
capture, co-optation and corruption which clearly existed in Bangladesh, apparently 
confirming the existence of an “iron law of oligarchy” identified by Michels’ 
(1915/1962) in his classic study of left-wing political parties. Michels’ argument was 
that leaders’ ability to control information and patronage and to use their charisma to 
retain their loyalty enabled them to capture organizations, divert them from their 
original goals, and disempower and marginalise their members. During a more 
optimistic era Julie Fisher (1994) made the argument that participatory leadership in 
parts of the development NGO sector around the world was challenging and even 
eliminating the “iron law”. Yet the evidence for such a claim has proved difficult to 
find. Houtzager and Lavalle (2010) report from Brazil that political NGO legitimacy 
tends to be undermined because these organizations offer only “assumed 
representation” (since their leaders are not usually selected by members) and a 
“subject commitment” to their constituents (since there are few mechanisms to make 
formal accountability possible). Authoritarianism, opportunism and corruption have 
been common features of the Bangladesh context, allowing local researchers such as 
Mannan (2010) to attribute the decline of NGOs such as GSS primarily “to poor 
management and leadership”.  
 
While the leaders of these agencies that set out with such progressive ideals do 
have much to answer for, these limitations cannot simply be attributed to 
personal failures but also to the need to manage the complex demands of 
external donors and the dysfunctional conflicts and risks generated by a weak 
and predatory state and a deeply divided, clientelistic and often violent civil 
society. Privileged access to resources, weak accountability and an 
authoritarian cultural environment not only undermined democratic processes 
and collegiality inside these organizations, but also increased the temptation to 
exploit the patronage system. NK’s persistence suggests that although the odds 
are heavily stacked against NGOs in the radical sub-sector, and NGO survival 
is a matter of both structure and agency, it might be possible for an 
organization with integrity to nevertheless successfully negotiate the complex 
environment in which political development work takes place in Bangladesh.  
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Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the radical NGO sub-sector in Bangladesh leads us to two main 
conclusions. First, after a promising start for radical NGO work under Bangladesh’s 
military governments the emergence of an era of fragile parliamentary democracy did 
not offer these NGOs the political opportunities that were expected. We have 
analysed three main sets of reasons for this. The malign influence of international 
donors, problems of weak management and leadership, and a range of societal factors 
that included the persistence and evolution of strong vertical patron-client 
relationships each intervened as factors that undermined the potential of this sub-
sector to catalyse democratic political change. During the period from the late 1990s 
when civil society support was in fashion with donors such as the UK’s DFID, large 
grants were offered to organizations such as GSS and Samata that they were unable to 
absorb. Too rapid scaling up placed pressures on those organizations that lacked 
strong management systems and internal democratic decision making processes and 
contributed to organizational failure. If donors for a brief period were guilty of 
“killing with kindness”, this was not the case was not for very long. Neoliberal 
development policy took a turn away from the “good governance” agenda that saw a 
role for radical civil society towards a more managerialized vision that placed the 
private sector and NGOs as private service providers at its centre. At the same time, 
some of the NGOs in the radical sub-sector were characterised by dysfunctional 
and/or compromised organizational systems. There were charismatic individual 
leaders that mitigated against the emergence of strong second tier leaders and 
managers, a prioritisation of radical development rhetoric over “nuts and bolts” 
organization and management, and vertical accountabilities that left leaders 
vulnerable to co-option into patronage politics.  
 
The decline of the radical NGO sub-sector highlights the role of clientelism in 
restrictively shaping political participation. Radical NGO mobilisation approaches 
attempted to challenge local level patron-client relations by building horizontal 
solidaristic groups and confronting the local power structure. But there were flaws in 
NGO leaders’ political strategies for social mobilisation that severely underestimated 
the fact that efforts to challenge “the net” would inevitably meet with strong 
resistance from entrenched interests at the local level (Engberg-Pedersen and Webster 
2002). Furthermore, the dominance of clientelistic parties in Bangladesh restricted 
opportunities for NGOs to create political space in which horizontal forms of social 
capital could be created, or to evolve organizational structures that are more 
democratic in terms of leadership and decision making, and in terms of their capacity 
to represent the poor. In most cases, these democratic forms of leadership and 
representative structures simply failed to emerge. The intensification of political 
patronage under electoral democracy also made NGOs more vulnerable to allegations 
of co-option and malfeasance, which also contributed to the decline of the radical sub-
sector.  
 
While the inadequacy of the state’s response to problems of poverty and inequality 
continues to provide a viable space for various types of development NGOs to 
operate, such work now takes place in a neoliberal policy environment that 
increasingly favours private sector responses to development problems. This has 
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contributed to a depoliticization of the NGO sector, many of whose organizations 
have now become vehicles for corporate interests rather than for consolidating 
democratic structures by confronting local power structures or challenging the state. 
The environment favours organizations that move away from earlier concerns with 
democratization to concentrate instead on market-based activities. This has served to 
produce a more narrowly defined NGO organizational legitimacy that is focused on 
“organizational longevity and competitive edge in securing scarce resources” 
(Feldman, 2001, p.242) rather than on than the consolidation of democratic political 
processes.  
 
The second main conclusion is that there is nothing inevitable about the failure of the 
radical NGO sub-sector as a strategy for representing and mobilising the rural poor. 
Contradictions persist between NGOs and the state, and the people whom they claim 
to represent (White, 1999; Feldman, 2001). The findings set out here do not negate 
the critical role of effectively led radical organizations in helping subordinate classes 
to escape the constraints imposed their ability to participate in public politics, nor the 
need to give their leaders the authority and resources that enable them to perform their 
tasks. The population of organizations in the sub-sector may have declined since its 
1990s heyday, but an organization that makes the “right” decisions within this 
complex environment can maintain a radical approach, as Nijera Kori, a survivor 
from the radical sub-sector, shows. Beyond the world of development NGOs, other 
forms of civil society actor also offer positive examples, such as the more recent 
generation of small radical campaigning NGOs centred on workers’ rights or 
environmental action, or the emergence of informal trade unions and “unruly” forms 
of resistance among women garment workers (Hossain 2017b). More than two 
decades of rapid economic restructuring and unequal growth in Bangladesh continues 
to feed popular demands for democratization in the form of movements and 
confrontations that urge government to better respond to peoples’ needs. Radical civil 
society has now diversified into other forms. The performance of such organizations 
depends on the need to create accountability and incentive systems that oblige them to 
maximise the interests of their members rather than themselves, and perhaps, on their 
capacity to identify new spaces in which new forms of clientelism can be harnessed to 
pro-poor agendas.  
 26 
 
                                                
Notes 
 
1 The influx of foreign assistance during 1970s shaped the incipient NGO sector and 
this continued to be case into the 2000s, after which the influence of aid declined. 
This was because it became proportionally less significant to the country’s improving 
financial position as it experienced steady economic growth. Although aid had been 
received in the Pakistan period, it increased significantly after 1971 and led to what 
Sobhan (1982, p.8) termed the country’s “crisis of external dependency”. A total 
US$612m was committed in the six months following the end of the war, while 
another $886m was received in 1972-3. The bulk of foreign aid was in the form of 
governmental bilateral and multilateral food aid, grants and loans. This mainstream 
development assistance provided a high level of support to NGOs as service delivery 
organizations and contributed to the rise of mainstream NGOs as development actors 
during the 1980s and 1990s. But there was also a small component of non-
governmental foreign assistance from outside the mainstream – provided by 
international solidarity type organizations/funders such as NOVIB and Canadian 
University Service Overseas (CUSO). This played an important role in helping to 
shape radical NGOs. 
 
2 With the brief exception of an eighteen-month period in 2006-7 when a military-
backed “caretaker government” took power and oversaw new elections. 
 
3 The demands of political competition can easily blur the lines between pressure 
groups and political parties, and individual leaders can change from being outsiders to 
insiders. This leads to boundaries that can become unclear and shifting (McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Lewis 2011b). 
 
4 The State of Democracy in South Asia report (2006). 
 
5 Not all NGOs fell into one or other camp - NGOs such as Proshika aimed to 
combine social mobilization with credit services. 
 
6 In Devine’s doctoral thesis and subsequent publications on Samata, the NGO was 
given a fictional name, Sammo, to preserve anonymity. However, the NGO’s staff 
subsequently made it known that they would prefer the organization to be named in 
future publications (Joseph Devine, personal communication). I have therefore 
followed the author’s advice on this point. 
 
7 Paolo Freire, 1972, Pedagogy of the Oppressed; Ivan Illich, 1971, Deschooling 
Society.  
 
8 With over half the rural population considered landless in a society that was 
predominantly rural and agricultural, poverty and landlessness were combined in the 
NGO view of its “target group” (Lewis 1993). 
   
9 Grameen Bank, the leading micro-credit organization, was affected when 
Muhammed Yunus, its founder, attempted to form a new popular grassroots-based 
political party in 2006. The plan led to immediate resistance from the other political 
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parties and was soon abandoned, perhaps in recognition of the high costs of entry to 
competitive politics that included coercion and violence. The AL Yunus then 
subjected Yunus to a process of political victimization that led eventually to his 
removal from the organization on the spurious grounds of being over the retirement 
age. The most likely explanation was the threat posed by the Grameen Bank’s 
alternative nationwide patronage network of grassroots lender groups that might have 
posed a threat to the Awami League’s own parallel patronage system. 
   
10 The word paisha here refers to small change. Paisha is a fractional unit of cash in 
South Asia. In Bangladesh there are 100 paisha to one taka, the local unit of currency. 
One UK pound is approximately 100 taka. 
 
11 Some NGOs, notably BRAC, have successfully reduced donor dependence by 
establishing market-based enterprises that have generated significant income, but this 
strategy has contributed to the organization moving away from radical political work.  
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